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The Technological Family:
What's New and What's Not
MARSHA GARRISON*
Over the past half-century, the processes of conception and prenatal
development have emerged from the hidden recesses of the body into
the glare of the laboratory. New technologies now make it possible to
conceive a baby without sex and to both predict and witness the process
of fetal development. A baby may have as many as six "parents"-
sperm donor, egg donor, gestator, gestator's husband, and a couple who
has "commissioned" the pregnancy. Would-be parents can select their
baby's sex and, with prenatal tests and abortion, ensure that their baby
is not born with congenital defects such as Down's Syndrome or spina
bifida.
Family law has begun to deal with some of the legal issues posed by
our new ability to manipulate the reproductive process. What the de-
veloping law makes clear is that, while technology may powerfully
affect the process of becoming a parent, it has not strongly affected the
reality of being a parent. Nor has reproductive technology significantly
altered courts' assessment of what is relevant to the determination of
parental rights and responsibilities. Indeed, while commentators con-
tinue to urge that the new technologies "are creating new kinds of
family and social relationships . , the evidence instead suggests that
technology itself has played no substantial role in expanding the range
of family forms. Families have indeed changed over the past half-
century, but the changes are social, not technological.
That is not to say that the new technologies do not have the potential
to change our family life. First, the new methods of conception offer
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. CANADA ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 1 PRO-
CEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 41 (1993) [hereinafter PROCEED WITH CARE].
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the possibility of purchased parenthood. Today's would-be parents can
select and buy sperm, egg, and a human incubator for "their" baby just
as they might choose furniture and hire an interior decorator to design
the baby's room. While baby sale has been with us for a long while,
the sale of reproductive capacity and material has not; moreover, baby
sales have taken place in the black and gray market, not in the open or
with the help of medical professionals. Second, the new technologies
permit significant delay in the reproductive process. While sexual con-
ception invariably produces a birth within 300 days or not at all, tech-
nological conception may involve sperm, ova, or preembryos that have
been cryopreserved for years. Both commercial and delayed parenthood
present difficult questions relating to the ownership of genetic material
and the status of preembryos that may-or may not-become human
lives. Courts and legislatures have only begun to grapple with these
genuinely novel aspects of the technological revolution in reproduction.
The balance of this essay briefly explores both faces of technological
conception-what's new and what's not.
I. Technological Conception and Parenting:
Novel Beginnings, Traditional Results
Louise Brown, the first child conceived through in vitro fertilization
(IVF), noted in an interview given at age nineteen that she was "just
an ordinary girl."-2 Of course, Louise's birth was not ordinary; as the
first child ever conceived in a petri dish, it was worldwide news. Indeed,
the very fact that Louise was interviewed nineteen years later is testa-
ment to the extraordinariness of her birth. But while Louise was con-
ceived in vitro, she was conceived using the sperm and ova of her
married parents who had failed to conceive a child sexually, parents
who planned to raise Louise after her birth and who in fact did so.
Louise's family relationships were thus extraordinarily ordinary. Louise
may have felt particularly wanted because her parents went to such
lengths to produce her, but there is no reason to suppose that Louise's
experience as the child of a married couple who were both her bio-
logical and nurturing parents would in other respects differ from the
experiences of children of married couples who conceive sexually.
Today, the vast majority of children conceived technologically are
like Louise Brown. In 1996, slightly more than 20,000 babies were
conceived using IVF technology in the United States. But only 1,100
of these babies were conceived using donated eggs; the rest were the
2. Ruth Deech, Infertility and Ethics, 9 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 337, 338 (1997).
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biological children of the women who gave birth to them.3 And, like
the mother of Louise Brown, the vast majority of these women were
married, had employed their husbands' sperm to produce a preembryo,
and planned to raise the child in a marital family. Most technological
births thus involve the most traditional of families; indeed, would-be
parents typically seek access to the new technologies precisely because
they want a "traditional" parent-child relationship, rather than one
achieved through adoption or extramarital sex.4
Technological births like that of Louise Brown raise no legal ques-
tions whatsoever. No commentator has suggested, in cases like hers,
that parentage should be determined any differently than it has been in
cases where conception occurred sexually. Nor is there any obvious
justification for reliance on an untraditional approach.
It is true, of course, that those who seek access to the new technol-
ogies do not invariably conform to the traditional family pattern I have
just described. Even if the vast majority of IVF procedures involve
married women employing their own eggs and husband's sperm, some
involve "donated" eggs, sperm, or both. And experts estimate that as
many as 40 percent of women who currently seek artificial insemination
with donor sperm (AID) are single and lesbian. 5 Unlike the case of
3. U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1996 NATIONAL ART FERTILITY REPORT
nat. summ., § 1 (1999), <http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art96> (visited July 14,
1999) (based on data from 300 U.S. fertility clinics representing "almost all clinics in
the United States" employing 1VF technology; donated egg births were calculated
based on live births per cycle figures).
4. See Kenneth D. Alpern, Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and
Significance of Having Children, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 158
(Kenneth D. Alpern ed. 1992) (noting that, for most people, "adoption is a second
choice" due both to the lack of "genetically based affinities of temperament, interest,
or understanding ... a genetically based physical resemblance to the parents ... [and
because] an adopted child, it is generally felt, is just not, in the fullest sense, one's
own; one is not a real parent of the child."). See also LYNDA B. FENWICK, PRIVATE
CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW
ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 217-18 (1998); LAWRENCE J. KAP-
LAN & ROSEMARIE TONG, CONTROLLING OUR REPRODUCTIVE DESTINY: A TECHNO-
LOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 242 (1994).
5. Gabrielle Wolf, Frustrating Sperm: Regulation of AID in Victoria Under the
Infertility Treatment Act 1995, 10 AUST. J. FAM. L. 1, 28 n. 116 (1996) (quoting director
of California sperm bank). See also Emma Cook, So You Want a Baby But There's No
Sign of Mr Right, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 16, 1997, at 5 (quoting medical estimates
that 300 single British women per year-10 times the number five years earlier-were
becoming parents through AID); Janet Kinosian, And Baby Makes Two: These Days,
More Thirty-Something Women Are Opting For Single Parenthood, NEWSDAY, May
11, 1999 (providing anecdotal accounts of AID use by single women). There are no
recent national data on births achieved using artificial insemination (AI), but a survey
conducted by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment revealed that, during
1986-87, there were approximately 65,000 Al births, 30,000 of which involved donor
semen (AID). At the time of the survey, 90% of AID users were married women who
sought AID because of their husbands' infertility. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH-
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Louise Brown, such births do sometimes give rise to litigation and legal
controversy. But they do not, in fact, produce genuinely novel family
forms.
Take the most common untraditional case, that of a single woman
utilizing AID. The result is a single mother who has no current rela-
tionship with her child's biological father, whose identity is probably
unknown. Such a family is not obviously different than that of the single
mother who conceived with an anonymous or semi-anonymous sexual
partner: each child has an unknown and absent father, with whom the
mother had an insignificant pre-birth relationship; each child lacks pa-
ternal relations and relationships. While women who conceive using
AID may "replace" the absent father with other male figures or even
a second "mother," so may women who conceive sexually. While it is
true that single women seeking AID invariably intend to become par-
ents, women who conceive sexually with an anonymous partner may
also intend a pregnancy. Nor is it obvious, from the child's perspective,
that pregnancy by accident or design is an important determinant of the
parent-child relationship.
It is obvious, however, that single women's use of AID represents
only a minor variation in a major social phenomenon. Births to un-
married mothers have increased dramatically in recent years; between
1970 and 1993, births to unmarried mothers increased from 10.7 per-
cent to 31 percent of the annual total.6 There is no evidence that AID
has played a major role in producing this shift.
Women who choose to become parents without partners do so for
varied reasons and become pregnant in varied ways. But the end result
is typically the same-a child with one residential parent. Whether
conceived sexually or technologically, few of these children have sig-
nificant paternal ties.7 It is true that older, well-educated women who
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES:
SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY 3 (1988). But the advent of intracytoplasmic sperm
injection (ICSI), involving the in vitro microinjection of a single spermatid into an
ovum, has dramatically altered the treatment of male infertility. A large portion of
couples who formerly resorted to AID now conceive a child biologically related to
husband and wife using IVF and ICSI; thus, in 1996, ICSI was used in 30% of UI.S.
IVF cycles. 1996 ART REPORT, supra note 3.
6. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998 80, tbl. 100 (1998) (1990s data), with U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1996 79, tbl. 98 (1997) (1970s data).
7. Experts estimate that no more than a quarter of nonmarital children are born to
cohabiting couples. See Larry L. Bumpass & J.A. Sweet, Children's Experience in
Single-Parent Families: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 21 FAM.
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 256 (1990); Andrew J. Cherlin, The Weakening Link Between
Marriage and the Care of Children, 20 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 302,303 (1988).
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choose single parenthood are able to offer their children advantages
that younger, less educated mothers cannot, and that these women may
disproportionately become mothers technologically rather than sexu-
ally; but it is socioeconomic status, not technology, that determines that
advantage. In sum, while the rise of single motherhood has undeniably
and profoundly altered our family life, there is no evidence to support
the view that the phenomenon results from AID, or that AID defines a
distinctive subset of single-parent families.
Even in cases of technological conception involving "divided" par-
entage, the ultimate result is typically an altogether familiar parent-
child relationship. When a married couple employs AID to achieve a
pregnancy, for example, the result is not all that different from a preg-
nancy resulting from marital infidelity.8 Husbands who know that they
are not biological fathers do sometimes agree to act as fathers to their
wives' children. We know so because of the cases in which they later
attempt to back out; and we know that courts have been hostile to these
attempts, just as they have been in the case of AID.9 Indeed, AID
statutes conferring parental status on a consenting husband, which have
now been adopted in most states, represent little more than the codifi-
cation of the equitable doctrine of paternity estoppel specifically ap-
plied to the new AID context. IVF using donated eggs and husband
sperm represents a novel twist in the traditional pattern-unfaithful
husbands have rarely attempted to rear their nonmarital children, at
Nor do the fathers of nonmarital children typically play a responsible role in child
rearing; less than 30% of them are even obligated to pay child support. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND
FATHERS: 1991 6-7, 12 tbl. F (Current Population Reports No. P60-187, 1995) (re-
porting that 56% of custodial mothers, 41% of custodial fathers, and 27% of never-
married mothers had been awarded child support in 1991 and that 34.0% of custodial
parents without support orders reported simply that they "did not pursue a child support
award," 17.5% that they "did not want child support, 16.5% that they believed "other
parent [was] unable to pay, and 17.5% that they were "unable to locate [the] other
parent").
8. Experts variously estimate the rate of nonmarital paternity among births to mar-
ried women. See Serge Bredart & Robert M. French, Do Babies Resemble Their Fathers
More Than Their Mothers? A Failure to Replicate Christenfeld and Hill 1995, 20
EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 129, 130-31 (1998) (summarizing research reports
and noting estimates of extramarital paternity of 6% to 30% in southern England and
10% in rural Michigan); S. Macintyre & A. Sooman, Non-Paternity and Prenatal Ge-
netic Screening, 338 LANCET 869 (1991) (reporting that the proportion of U.S. children
born to married women who were not fathered by the women's husbands is probably
from 1% to 5%, but may be as high as 10%).
9. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
T1ON: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02A, comment d. (Council Draft No. 5,
Oct. 6, 1998) (citing cases and noting that "[m]ost states find husbands estopped from
challenging paternity under certain facts"). See also Jean A. Goldstein, Note, Children
Born of the Marriage-Res Judicata Effect on Later Support Proceedings, 45 Mo. L.
REv. 307, 308 n. 5 (1980).
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least in the marital household-but the basic pattern is the same. In
each case, a married couple has decided to rear a child to which only
one is biologically related. Whether the child is conceived sexually or
technologically, the couple must cope with the issue of secrecy and the
stress associated with their differing relationships to the child they are
rearing together.'
0
Even when both husband and wife are biologically unrelated to the
child they produce, the family that they form closely resembles a tra-
ditional adoptive relationship. The "adoption" may have occurred pre-
natally and without a formal legal proceeding, but the end result is the
same: husband and wife will rear a child who is biologically related to
neither of them. As with adoption, the parents must come to terms with
having a child whose appearance and genetic heritage are nonfamilial
in origin; their child, like a child who has been formally adopted, must
deal with the uncertainty and informational needs occasioned by having
unknown biological progenitors.'"
10. These stresses are significant. While the evidence suggests that most married
AID users plan to maintain secrecy (see J.N. Robinson et al., Attitudes of Donors and
Recipients to Gamete Donation, 6 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 307 (1991); D.M. Berger
et al., Psychological Patterns in Donor Insemination Couples, 31 CAN. J. PSYCHIAT.
818 (1986)), the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies
concluded that "secrecy [about AID] places great strains on families." Some fathers
interviewed said that they felt "fraudulent," while some mothers indicated that they
felt they were "living a lie." Adults born through DI who were interviewed by Com-
mission researchers also reported that "the decision to keep DI a secret was very
damaging-they felt deceived and said they had always sensed that something was
'wrong' in the family. Some told the Commission that they found out about the method
of conception at a time of family crisis, such as divorce or death in the family-a time
when secrets are difficult to keep." PROCEED wrT CARE, supra note 1, at 464-65.
Men married to women who have borne children through AID also tend to support
mandatory counseling before AID. See C.L. Wendland et al., Donor Insemination-A
Comparison of Lesbian Couples, Heterosexual Couples and Single Women, 65 FER-
TILITY & STERILITY 764 (1996).
11. Adopted and technologically conceived children have identical needs for non-
identifying health information about their biological families. Children from both
groups may also want information about the identity of their biological progenitors.
Some experts have suggested that technologically conceived children will want such
identifying information less frequently-adopted children may be more inclined to feel
rejected by their biological parents and thus want explanatory information-but we
know that some technologically conceived children do want such information, and want
it badly. See Margaret R. Brown, Whose Eyes Are These, Whose Nose?, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 7, 1994, at 12; Peggy Orenstein, Are You My Father?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995,
§ 6 (magazine); Karen M. Thomas, The Donor Connection: Families Are Chipping
Away at the Taboos and Secrecy that Once Surrounded Artificial Insemination, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 23, 1997, at IF. On the other hand, only a small fraction of
adoptees ultimately seek the identity of their biological parents. See William Feigelman
& Arnold Silverman, Adoptive Parents, Adoptees, and the Sealed Record Controversy,
67 SOC. CASEWORK 219 (1986) (finding that 15% of children of surveyed adoptive
parents had asked to see their adoption records and 4% had contacted birth families);
John P. Triseliotis, Obtaining Birth Certificates, in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL POL-
ICY, LAW, AND SOCIOLOGY 34 (Philip Bean ed., 1984) (based on adoptees' applications
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All this is not to say that our concept of the family has been static;
a half-century ago the New York Times Sunday Magazine simply would
not have featured a family consisting of an Afro-American toddler
(Erez), his gay, male, white "parents" (one of whom had adopted the
toddler when "well past 40" and before meeting the other), plus "a
company of extras," including "gay uncles, career-track women,
stranded grannies, and loving if hired hands" who baby sit and serve
as a larger, extended "shadow family."' 12 The shift in our family life
that has made possible-and socially acceptable-a family like that of
Erez is large and real. But there is little evidence that technology has
played a major role in determining the nature or direction of familial
change. Nor is there evidence that the families which arise from tech-
nological conception are markedly different from those that arise from
sexual conception, adoption or, as in the case of Erez, from shared
family life.
Given that technological conception, for all its novelty and glitter,
ultimately produces altogether familiar family forms and problems, it
should come as no surprise that courts have typically dealt with ques-
tions of parental rights and responsibilities in these cases using very
traditional lines of attack. The first cases to be litigated involved AID.
Given the marital legitimacy presumption, litigation arose almost in-
variably in the context of parental divorce and involved a husband who
sought to avoid child support obligations by challenging his paternity.
In most of these cases, the AID child had been treated by both parties
as a child of the marriage for years and-just as they did in similar
circumstances outside the AID context-courts typically relied on eq-
uitable doctrines such as laches or estoppel to hold that the mother's
husband was the child's legal father; occasionally, a court held the child
to be illegitimate, but nonetheless imposed a support obligation.
13
At least one court has applied the same approach when the husband
sought to have himself declared the sole parent of children conceived
through in vitro fertilization with the husband's sperm and donated
for access to birth records in Great Britain, estimating that 21% of all British adoptees
might apply for birth records during their adult years).
12. Jesse Green, Orbiting the Son, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, § 6 (magazine),
at 66.
13. See Note, Children Born of the Marriage-Res Judicata Effect on Later Support
Proceedings, supra note 9; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, at § 3.02A comment d (citing
cases and noting that "[m]ost states find husbands estopped from challenging paternity
under certain facts"). See also Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(holding child illegitimate but husband liable for child's support based on consent to
AID).
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ova. 14 After all, when a married woman achieves pregnancy with her
husband's consent, her husband's sperm, and a donated ovum, she is
in exactly the same position as the husband who has consented to AID
(or agreed to father a nonmarital child). Both marital partners should
be able to rely on the marital presumption of legitimacy just as they
can in the case of AID. To hold otherwise would involve perhaps un-
constitutional gender discrimination; certainly there is no basis in fam-
ily law or policy for treating the two cases differently.
Even in a "five-parent" case-sperm donor, egg donor, gestational
surrogate, and commissioning couple-where the marital presumption
does not apply, estoppel principles remain applicable. Indeed, a Cali-
fornia court recently used just this approach when the male member of
the commissioning couple sought to avoid child support obligations
during a divorce proceeding commenced shortly after the child's birth:
"By consenting to the birth of a child" the Court quite traditionally
noted, "... a husband incurs the legal status and responsibility of fa-
therhood." 15 While the court's analysis of the motherhood issue was
considerably more tortured, there is no reason why the estoppel prin-
ciple should not apply with equal force to a wife; both parties, by
consenting to the birth of a child, should logically incur the legal status
and responsibilities of parenthood.
Courts have also taken a traditional approach to contracts purporting
to determine the parental rights and obligations of participants in tech-
nological conception. It is black letter family law that contracts between
parents that determine parental status, child custody, and child support
are voidable; whether such contracts were entered premaritally, post-
maritally, or without any marriage at all, courts routinely declare them
unenforceable. 16 It should thus come as no surprise that courts
have generally followed an identical approach in analyzing the legality
of surrogate parenting contracts and agreements between a mother
14. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
15. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. App. Ct. 1998).
16. See Unif. Premarital Agreements Act § 3(b), 9B U.L.A 376 (1987) ("The right
of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement"); IRA
M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMiLY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 839 (3d ed. 1998) ("Long
tradition in the domestic relations area would seem to ensure.., that courts would not
consider themselves bound by custody provisions they believed injurious to the child's
interest. The law of separation agreements in every states is explicit on that point, and
there is no reason why premarital agreements would be treated differently.") See also
Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981) (custody); Combs v. Sherry-Combs,
865 P.2d 50 (Wyo. 1993) (support); Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994)
(preconception contract between unmarried sexual partners absolving potential father
of support obligations).
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and known sperm donor limiting the donor's parental rights and
obligations. 17
I do not mean to suggest that the various forms of technological
conception present nothing new. Clearly these are novel ways of having
babies, that require extension of current legal doctrine. IVF even offers
one genuinely new relationship, that of the gestational mother who is
biologically unrelated to the child she carries to term. While mechanical
incubators may play the role of gestator for as much as a third of the
gestational period, sexual conception currently offers no possibility of
completely severing gestational from genetic motherhood. Nor can a
legal contest between a gestational and genetic mother be resolved by
recourse to traditional doctrines like estoppel and the marital presump-
tion of legitimacy. But that is not to say that the determination of pa-
rental rights in such a case must rely on novel methods of analysis; the
simplest-and, I would argue-best approach in these cases is to say
that the genetic mother is the legal mother because she is the one bi-
ologically related to the child. Biology has been, after all, the primary
determinant of parenthood both in our law and culture. Parentage doc-
trines that ignore biology-the marital presumption of legitimacy, pa-
ternity estoppel, equitable adoption-all developed to protect the
child's emotional and economic interests. In the case of a woman who
gestates a child for another, these interests are simply not at stake.
Unsurprisingly, some courts have already employed just this kind of
reasoning in analyzing the claims of gestational versus genetic moth-
ers. 18
Courts could, of course, analyze the case of gestational surrogacy
and other forms of technological conception using novel rather than
traditional lines of attack. Indeed, the only high court to have addressed
claims by both "mothers" in a case of gestational surrogacy relied in
part on the genetic mother's intention to rear the child.' 9 Determining
17. The leading decision on surrogacy is, of course, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988). See also In re Moschetta, 25 Cal. Med. Rep. 4th 1218 (1994); R.R. v.
M.H, 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). For cases involving sperm donors and mothers,
see Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); C.M. v. C.C., 377
A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977); In re Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989). But
see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (granting summary judgment
against sperm donor who had signed written contract providing that his visitation was
at the convenience of lesbian couple and that he would not assert parental claims). For
other cases, see Annot., Rights and Obligations Resulting from Al, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295
(1991).
18. See Arrendondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup.Ct. 1994) (determining
maternity genetically); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1994)
(same).
19. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1993).
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parental rights based on the parties' intention is an untraditional method
of analysis. It is also a dangerous one. In our law and culture, there is
simply no sense in which parenthood has been connected with inten-
tion. Children may have biological parents, adoptive parents, or even
functional parents, whose rights and obligations derive from their con-
sensual assumption of the real job of child rearing, but no one is a
parent based on intention. Applied to sexual conception, an intention-
based approach would, logically, cast into doubt the parentage of the
many children one or both of whose parents did not intend to have
them. Even in the context of technological conception, it would suggest
that the woman who commissions a gestational surrogate birth should
be declared the mother even if it turns out that the baby is the biological
child of surrogate and husband. z Perhaps more importantly, there is
no obvious reason to abandon traditional methods of determining
parentage. 2 1
In sum, because the families that come into being through techno-
logical conception are not markedly different from those that come into
being in other ways, it makes sense for courts to utilize traditional
family law doctrine when resolving claims about parental status and
obligation. By and large, courts have followed this approach; they
should (and, we should hope, will) ignore the prompting of commen-
tators urging reliance on intention, contract, or any other doctrine that
does not apply to the rest of our families. To do otherwise risks incon-
sistent and unpredictable outcomes determined by the accident of how
a child is conceived rather than the lived reality of family life.
Legislation is still desirable to provide certainty and avoid litigation.
The majority of states now have statutes specifying that a child born
to a married woman through AID with her husband's consent is a child
20. Compare Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (based on blood tests
revealing "ordinary" surrogate's husband to be the genetic father of child born with
severe handicaps-and whom neither the sperm donor nor "surrogate" mother
wanted-surrogate and husband declared legal parents despite contract and intention
of sperm donor and his wife to become legal parents).
21. Some commentators have urged that parentage should be determined based on
gestation rather than intention or genetic tie. Gestation is, on the surface at least, a
traditional method of determining motherhood. But to rely on gestation as the deter-
minant of motherhood and genetics as the determinant of fatherhood would undesirably
introduce a gender-specific approach to the determination of parentage. Moreover, none
of the policy values that, in determining fatherhood, have been thought significant
enough to trump biology apply in the case of gestational surrogacy; the gestator's
contributions to the child's development, while vital, do not induce the kind of depen-
dence and attachment on the part of the child that have led courts to protect established
relationships. To focus on women's gestational role as the prime determinant of par-
enthood would also suggest that, if and when a mechanical incubator capable of sus-
taining fetal life and development throughout pregnancy is developed, the machine
should be recognized as "mother."
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of the marriage. 22 These statutes are squarely based on traditional fam-
ily law doctrine, in particular the marital presumption of legitimacy and
the doctrine of paternity estoppel. In looking at the newer parentage
issues arising from AID and IVF, legislatures should follow the same
approach, adapting traditional rules and policies to the technological
context.23 Families are social entities, not technological constructs;
children conceived technologically deserve the same protections and
status that our family law grants to all other children.
II. Commercialism and Reproductive
Control
While current family law doctrine offers courts and legislatures a
good deal of guidance in resolving the status issues arising from tech-
nological conception, it provides little help with the larger regulatory
issues that arise from the new reproductive technologies. The new tech-
nologies make possible an unprecedented level of commercialization
and reproductive manipulation. These new possibilities may not pro-
duce new family forms, but they certainly do raise fundamental ques-
tions about reproductive control, commercialization, and the status of
the preembryo. Our courts have just begun to consider these questions
and, outside the context of surrogacy contracts, our legislatures have
been almost entirely inactive.
Surrogacy legislation was spurred by the nationwide publicity ac-
corded the case of Baby M., involving the legality of an agreement by
a "surrogate" mother to relinquish the child she had conceived through
artificial insemination to the sperm donor and his wife in return for
$10,000.24 Almost half of the states enacted legislation dealing with
22. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act set out the principle that "[i]f, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." Unif.
Parentage Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 287, 301 (1987). As of 1994, fifteen states had adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act or a virtually identical standard; fifteen others had enacted
statutes that varied by eliminating the licensed physician requirement. See Commentary
to Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA) § 4, 9B U.L.A.
155 (Supp. 1994). See also Kathryn Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin
Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REv. 1641, 1645 (1984) (listing 21 states requiring
physician implantation).
23. A few states have already extended their AID statutes to provide for a similar
approach in cases of IVF with donated ova and gametes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11
(1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (Michie 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 555
(West. Supp. 1998); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.103 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-158 (Michie 1995).
24. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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commercial surrogacy. In all but a handful of states, legislatures simply
codified, in the surrogacy context, the traditional ban on baby-selling
and the principle that contracts respecting children's status are unen-
forceable. 25 These statutes thus fail to resolve the larger questions about
the commercialization of reproduction. Most do not apply to gestational
surrogacy, 26 and none affect the sale of genetic material. The result is
that would-be parents are perfectly free, as one recent headline put it,
to "shop for Ivy League eggs," 27 and sperm, and gestator-and to offer
thousands of dollars to get what they want.
Some commentators have argued that the new forms of commer-
cialism degrade child bearing in the same way that prostitution degrades
sex. Enough European nations have agreed with this assessment-
and moved to limit or ban such payments-that one commentator,
summarizing the European law on reproductive technology, notes
"non-commercialization" as an "area of convergence" across national
boundaries. 28 A commission appointed to recommend policies on re-
productive technology for Canada has recommended that even the pro-
viders of assisted reproduction should be noncommercial entities.29
25. Today, almost half of the states have legislation dealing with surrogacy; some
state laws criminalize participation in and/or brokering of a surrogacy agreement and
some explicitly permit noncommercial surrogacy. See IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1498 (3d ed. 1998). See also ROBERT BLANK & JANNA
C. MERRICK, HuMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING
RIGHTS 125, tbl. 5-1 (1995) (categorizing state laws). Only a handful of states permit
any form of commercial surrogacy. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 63-212 (West 1997 &
Supp. 1998); N.H. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B-1-B:32 (1994 & 1996 Supp.) (recognizing
judicially approved surrogacy contracts, specifying allowable payments, and allowing
surrogate to rescind agreement within 72 hours of child's birth); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 127.287 (Michie 1993) (excluding from baby-selling prohibitions a "lawful contract
to act as a surrogate" while "not prohibit[ing] a natural parent from refusing to place
a child for adoption after its birth"); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 et seq. (Michie 1995)
(setting out requirements for enforceable surrogacy contract, permitting payment of
"reasonable medical and ancillary costs," and authorizing surrogate rescission of con-
tract within 180 days of conception). Both the New Hampshire and Virginia laws
ostensibly forbid payment to surrogates, but contain broad exceptions allowing pay-
ment of the surrogate's "expenses."
26. In 1995, only ten states had statutes dealing with gestational surrogacy. See Lori
B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Moth-
erhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2350 n. 16 (1995).
27. Ova are rarely "donated" without compensation; many "donors" are sought
through advertising and paid fees of $3,000 or more. See Brigitte Greenberg, Infertile
Couples Shop for Ivy League Eggs, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999, at 4A; Jan Hoffman,
Egg Donations Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996,
at 1; Adrienne Knox, What's a Human Egg Worth? Debate Intensifies, MINN. STAR-
TRIBUNE, Apr. 5, 1998, at 1E.
28. Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of As-
sisted Conception-Room for Harmonization?, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS,
LAW, AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION 305, 315-16 (Donald Evans ed., 1996)
[hereinafter CREATING THE CHILD].
29. PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 1, at 477, 572, 593 (recommending that sperm
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There is no obvious reason for the United States to pursue a different
and more commercial path in reproductive medicine than that followed
by our peers among the family of nations. Like other industrialized
countries, we already ban organ sales30 and (except in Nevada) the sale
of sexual services. If the eager entrepreneur is not permitted to sell sex
or her spare kidney, one can certainly make a case that it is logically
inconsistent to allow her to sell her ova or gestational services. (Of
course, it is also possible to distinguish the two sales.)
But it is important to note that the U.S. system of health care fi-
nancing-reliant entirely on private insurance except in the case of the
elderly and very poor-is unlike that found in any other Western in-
dustrialized country. Nations that have moved to curb commercialism
in reproductive technology also have more centralized health care sys-
tems that curb commercialism in other aspects of medical practice as
well. Moreover, they have experience with health care regulation on a
scale never experienced here. It thus should not surprise us that it is
the United Kingdom, with "arguably ... the most centralized [health
care] delivery and financing system of any in Western Europe,", 31 that
has enacted the most comprehensive regulatory regime to govern tech-
nological conception. 32 In the United States, by contrast, fertility clin-
ics, like other medical providers, are frequently for-profit entities "in-
terested above all in turning a buck.", 33 The medical profession has not
sought regulation of commercialism in reproductive technology and the
public is not clamoring for such regulation either. A case may well
come along-like the Baby M. litigation-which will galvanize public
opinion and produce a national prohibition, like that which currently
obstructs organ sales. But until it does, we cannot expect commercial-
ism to wane; almost certainly it will increase.
Family law has no doctrines directly applicable to the general issue
of commercialism in reproductive medicine, nor is there any obvious
way for a court to now become involved in the monetary aspects of a
sperm or egg "deal;" except in the case of a preembryo sale, such
donors be compensated "only for their inconvenience and ... , the direct costs of do-
nation," that "payment for egg donation not be permissible," and that "[a]ssisted
conception services should not operate on a for-profit basis").
30. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b).
31. WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHics 1054 (5th ed.
1998).
32. For a detailed description of the British regulatory scheme, see DEREK MORGAN
& ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN FERTILIZATION & EMBRY-
OLOGY AcT 1990 (1991).
33. Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution in Making Babies: A Host of Break-
throughs-From Frozen Eggs to Borrowed DNA-Could Transform the Treatment of
Infertility, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997 (describing variation in access criteria).
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transactions are simply not, even arguably, baby sales.34 Other issues
in reproductive medicine-preembryo storage and disposition, sex se-
lection, multiple implantations, access criteria, cloning-are equally, if
not more, difficult to review through the litigation process. Divorce
courts have been squarely presented with the question of control over
the disposition of preembryos,3" but issues more typically reach a court
in a posture that does not permit resolution-or even review-of the
underlying policy question. For example, courts have reviewed the
practice of posthumous conception-but only in the context of a will
contest,36 and in a proceeding under the Social Security Act to deter-
mine whether a child born more than 300 days after the death of the
insured met the statutory definition of dependent.37 Confronted with
narrow questions of this sort, courts simply cannot develop the broad,
consistent policies that are necessary if we are to have a regime in which
reproductive technology is controlled by something other than the
dollar.
Do we want families in which parents routinely "design" and buy
the child they want? Such possibilities cannot fail to affect our family
life and family values. But the widespread availability of contraception,
abortion, and prenatal testing already permits would-be parents to exert
an unprecedented level of control over the reproductive process, while
"gray market" adoptions enable those who want a child to use cash to
get one. 8 It is not obvious that the new reproductive possibilities are
qualitatively different from those that have long been available; nor is
it obvious that they are not.
Other industrialized nations, recognizing both the importance and
difficulty of the issues, have established commissions of one sort or
another to assess public opinion, gather data, and make consistent pol-
icy recommendations. 39 The United States has not. We should. But,
without a tradition of national policymaking in either health care or
family life, it is not clear that we will.
34. Embryo sales, on the other hand, can easily be analogized to baby sales. See
Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Made for Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1997,
at IA.
35. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174
(N.Y. 1998).
36. Kane v. Superior Court (Hecht), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578 (Cal. App. 1995).
37. Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
38. See Diana Jean Schemo, Adoptions in Paraguay: Mothers Cry Theft, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at Al.
39. See JONATHAN GLOVER ET AL., ETHICS OF NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES: THE GLOVER REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 15 (1989). See also WHAT
PRICE PARENTHOOD? ETHICS AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 104 et seq. (Courtney S.
Campbell ed., 1992) (surveying policy development in a number of nations); Jean
Martin, Prioritising Assisted Conception Services, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note
28 (briefly describing work of commissions in the Netherlands and Sweden).
